Skip to content
gunkslab

Security

Known limits

What the design doesn’t cover, or doesn’t cover yet. Each is a confidential issue in the backlog (the number after it), with what would close it; every way in has how each stands today.

Not tried for real yet

  • On a real bot. The bots’ TLS, their key made on the chip, and signed updates over the air have been run off the bot only (desk-issues#5, desk-issues#6). Checking it on a real bot has the checks.

The bots

  • A bot in hand gives up what’s in its flash. That’s its Wi-Fi password, its update password and its broker key. The flash isn’t encrypted (desk-issues#4). All three are that bot’s alone: the key can be revoked and, on the bots’ own network, its Wi-Fi key removed. On a network with one password for everything (your own, on the bench), the Wi-Fi password is that one.
  • Updates over the air are signed, but the check runs after the image is written (desk-issues#6). A bot writes the new image to its spare slot, checks its signature, and wipes it if it’s wrong, before it restarts. A power cut in the second or so between the write and the wipe, on an image that isn’t signed, could start it. Secure boot, checked by the chip itself, would close that; it isn’t on. An older image signed with the same key is taken too: nothing checks versions. Not yet tried on a real board.
  • Bots share the Wi-Fi with everything else (desk-issues#7). The bots’ own network is the fix, and it’s a router change.
  • A bot doesn’t check certificates’ dates. The ESP32 core’s mbedTLS is built without them. It still checks the broker’s certificate is from its CA and for the broker’s name, and the broker checks the bots’ dates.
  • A bot’s certificate runs out after two years, and the bot can’t renew its own (desk-issues#8). The station’s log and the page warn from 60 days before; scripts/certs list says when, too.

Logins

  • One connection per login. A second program on the same login takes over the first one’s connection. The driving tool and the acceptance run both drive as the driver’s login, so they can’t run at once on one login.
  • A revoked client stays connected until it next connects, unless the broker restarts. scripts/certs revoke does that, so it’s only revoking by hand, in Vault, that leaves one on for a while.
  • The station’s certificate lasts a week on the machine that runs it. Its login may publish only the station’s own topics and the bots’ commands (2026-10-25), but those are still everything that drives a bot.
  • Programs on the broker’s own machine need no login. That applies to the development broker and to bench mode on 127.0.0.1: anything on that machine is trusted as much as the machine is.
  • Bench mode’s CA key is on disk, readable by you only. Whoever can read it can make any bench login.

Not a security limit, but close

  • The driving page can’t reach the cluster’s broker. It talks MQTT over WebSockets, which the cluster’s broker doesn’t offer, and a browser can’t easily show a certificate. On the cluster, driving is from the terminal (scripts/drive); the page drives on the development broker.
  • The overhead camera’s stream and login cross the Wi-Fi unencrypted (desk-issues#3). That’s only once a camera is up: none is yet.