Security
Checking it on a real bot
The bots’ side of the logins has been run off the bot only. A bot makes its key, prints a request, checks the certificate it’s given, and logs in over TLS. That code ran on a PC, on the same mbedTLS as the ESP32’s (2.28), and the certificate it got logged in to the broker’s configuration. What only a real ESP32 can show is below. Until it’s been run, the bots’ part of desk-issues#5 stays open.
These checks need a bot on the bench, on USB, and bench mode or the cluster’s broker. Logins and certificates has the steps for each; this page says what to look for.
The checks
| # | Do | Expect |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | Flash it with MQTT_CA, MQTT_PORT 8883 |
[mqtt] login: TLS, but no certificate yet: cert-request |
| 2 | cert-request |
A request between BEGIN CERTIFICATE REQUEST and END CERTIFICATE REQUEST, in about a second; openssl req -in bot-xxxxxx.csr -noout -verify says verify OK |
| 3 | cert-request again |
The same key: openssl req -noout -pubkey gives the same for both requests |
| 4 | scripts/bot-cert bot-xxxxxx.csr, then cert and paste |
[tls] certificate kept, until 2028-10-29; logging in as bot-xxxxxx, then [mqtt] up as bot-xxxxxx |
| 5 | Watch the broker’s log | New client connected ... as bot-xxxxxx, its TLS version and cipher |
| 6 | Watch the page, or scripts/broker watch |
Its hello, status and telemetry, as a simulated bot’s; it drives through the station |
| 7 | Its telemetry’s free memory | Stays steady over ten minutes; write down how much TLS took (against a build without MQTT_CA) |
| 8 | Power it off and on | It logs in again by itself, with no new cert-request |
| 9 | Restart the broker | It’s offline for a moment, then back by itself |
| 10 | MQTT_CA from another CA, reflash |
[mqtt] TLS failed: it won’t talk to a broker it can’t check |
| 11 | Revoke its certificate (scripts/certs revoke bot-xxxxxx) |
Dropped at once, and refused from then on; cert-clear then cert-request starts it over |
| 12 | Set your e-stop, then someone else’s; clear yours, then theirs (as an admin) | estop_on once; still stopped after yours is cleared; estop_off after theirs; it drives again only on a fresh command |
| 13 | An update over the air, with TLS in (scripts/bot-ota upload) |
It fits, [ota] signed by this bot's key, and the bot comes back up with its certificate and the new fw |
| 14 | An update signed with another key: GUNKSLAB_BENCH set to an empty folder, scripts/fw-sign key new there, then the upload |
[ota] update refused, the signature isn't by this bot's key; it keeps driving; power it off and on, and its fw is still the old |
| 15 | An unsigned update: the build’s own firmware.bin sent with PlatformIO’s espota.py |
[ota] update refused, not signed; the same after a power cycle |
| 16 | A file-system upload: espota.py -s with any file |
[ota] update refused: firmware only, and the upload fails |
| 17 | Pirate Stage, the same, once the car exists | As above |
Once they pass
- Fill in the bench guide’s and the logins guide’s expected output from what the bot really printed.
- Close the bots’ part of desk-issues#5.
- Note the memory TLS takes, and the flash left (
scripts/firmware build), in the firmware reference.